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Abstract
Recent papers have shown conditions under which vertical, mergers can
result in anticompetitive foreclosure of unintegrated rivals. These models
imply that a necessary but not sufficient condition for anticompetitive
foreclosure is that unintegrated rivals are less profitable after a vertical
merger. We test this hypothesis by examining the stock prices of unintegrated
rivals at the time of a vertical merger announcement and at the time of a
government antitrust complaint. We find no evidence to support the
foreclosure hypothesis.
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for able research assistance.Empirical Evidence on Vertical Foreclosure
I~ Introduction
Prior to the 1980s, the United States Department of Justice and the
Federal Trade Commission actively challenged vertical mergers, on the theory
that such mergers foreclosed unintegrated rivals in the downstream market from
access to inputs supplied by the merged firm. This policy changed when
critics of the foreclosure theory claimed that vertically integrated firms
have no incentive to transfer products between the upstream and downstream
markets at a price other than the market price and, therefore, vertical
mergers have no effect on the price charged to consumers.I The arguments
against attacking vertical mergers were also supported by research that
demonstrated that vertical integration can enhance efficiency.2 As a result,
vertical mergers currently receive very little, if any, attention from the
enforcement agencies.
Recent contributions by Ordover, Saloner, and Salop (1990), Krattenmaker
and Salop (1986), and Salinger (1988, 1989) have reopened the debate about the
competitive effects of vertical mergers. They each use theoretical models to
show that vertical foreclosures can raise costs to unintegrated rivals and
; See Allen (1971), Bork (1969), Peltzman (1969), and Liebeler (1968).
For a concise summary of the specific objections to the foreclosure theory,
see Ordover, Saloner, and Salop (1990).
2Some of these studies, Spengler (1950) and Liebeler (1968), demonstrate
that vertical mergers will improve social welfare if they eliminate the
successive monopoly margins charged at each stage of production. Other
studies, Klein, Crawford, and Alchian (1978) and Williamson (1979),
demonstrate that vertical integration and hence vertical mergers may reduce
transaction costs and therefore improve social welfare~lead to higher prices for consumers. Although these models demonstrate that
foreclosure can be a profitable strategy that injures competition, to date
these theories have not been tested empirically. If vertical foreclosure
rarely occurs, or if it occurs only in a narrow set of circumstances, changes
in current policy on vertical mergers may not be justified.
A necessary but not sufficient condition for anticompetitive foreclosure
is that the vertical merger cause the unintegrated rivals to be less
profitable. This result from previous theoretical work is tested here on a
sample selected from all vertical merger cases challenged by the Justice
Department and the Federal Trade Commission during the period 1963 to 1982.
We find no evidence of anticompetitive market foreclosure for the sample of
cases challenged by the antitrust agencies.
One possible explanation for our results is that the tests over the
entire sample are significantly affected by a few weak cases brought by the
government during a period of aggressive antitrust enforcement. We test this
by examining variables that have been identified by Krattenmaker and Salop
(1986) and the Department of Justice merger guidelines as being conducive to
foreclosure, such as barriers to entry and industry concentration,. Even the
cases with high industry concentration and barriers to entry, which
potentially should exhibit substantial market power, provide no evidence of
foreclosure, While this does not preclude anticompetitive foreclosure as a
possibility, it does call into question the cases brought by the antitrust
agencies during the 1960s and the 1970s. Until the proponents of the more
rigorous economic version of the foreclosure theory provide clearer guidelines
about the conditions under which vertical mergers are likely to injurecompetition, continuation of the current policy of not contesting these
mergers seems justified.
If. Theory of Anticompetitive Foreclosure
The foreclosure arguments used to challenge vertical mergers during the
1950s and 1960s were easily discredited because no formal theory was used to
support them. More recent attempts to reconstruct the foreclosure theory have
used economic models to demonstrate that vertical foreclosure can reduce
competition. The key to each of these models is that foreclosure raises the
costs to the unintegrated rivals of the merged firm and this, under certain
conditions, raises the price Of the final product to the consumer.
The legal definition of foreclosure focuses on the ability of unintegrated
firms to buy from or sell to integrated rivals., while the economic definition
of anticompetitive foreclosure focuses on whether prices to consumers
increase. Salinger (1988) has provided a model that demonstrates the
conditions under which anticompetitive foreclosure will occur. His basic
model assumes that there is some preexisting market power in both the upstream
(input~ and downstream (final product) markets, and that both the input and
the final product are produced under constant marginal costs.
Usinga Cournot model, Salinger shows that a vertical merger will have
two effects. First, the number of competitors in the unintegrated segment of
the input market is reduced because the merged firm neither buys from nor
sells to the unintegrated firms, causing the price of the input to
unintegrated firms in the downstream market to rise. Second, the merging firm
lowers its marginal cost because it is able to avoid the successive monopoly
rents in the upstream market. The lower marginal cost for t~e integrated firmallows it to expand output by reducing its price, thus reducing the derived
demand for unintegrated rivals in the upstream market. When the effect of the
decrease in competition in the upstream market dominates the decrease in the
derived demand for unintegrated upstream firms, the price of the input to the
unintegrated firms in the downstream market increases. When the latter effect
exceeds the reduction in the integrated firm’s cost, the price of the final
product increases.
Our primary concern in this paper is whether anticompetitive foreclosure
occurs, since that is the motivation for antitrust policy. In all of the
models of foreclosure we have examined, it can be shown that the foreclosed
unintegrated rivals in the downstream market will be less profitable after a
vertical merger of a rival. The Appendix provides a simple Cournot model
consistent with Salinger’s model to illustrate that a necessary condition for
anticompetitive foreclosure is that unintegrated rivals are less profitable
after the merger. However, the effects on integrated rivals or unintegrated
rivals in the upstream market are model specific. For example, in the
Ordover, Saloner, and Salop (1990) model~ the unintegrated rival in the
downstream market suffers a decrease in profits as a result of foreclosure.
However, it is interesting to note that in their model the profits of the
unintegrated firm in the upstream market increase, because of the increase in
its market power that occurs as a result of foreclosure in the downstream
market.
llI. Empirical Examination of Vertical Mergers
The models discussed above suggest that a test of whether vertical
mergers contested ~by the government resulted in economic foreclosure can be
4implemented by examining the returns to stockholders of unintegrated rivals at
the time of the announcement of a vertical merger. The foreclosure hypothesis
suggests that unintegrated rivals will be less profitable. If this is true,
returns to stockholders for these rivals will fall because of a lower expected
present discounted value of future earnings.
A problem with this study, as well as with many similar event studies,
is that there may be alternative explanations for changes in stock prices as a
result of an announcement. The most serious alternative explanation is that
vertical integration provides the merging firm with cost advantages that are
unavailable to unintegrated rivals, so the profits of unintegrated rivals will
fall because their rivals are more competitive (efficient). For the
efficiency gains to imply lower stock prices for rivals, the gains must be
available only to the merging firm. If rivals also can realize the efficiency
gains, either by internal expansion or merger, than the merging firm does not
realize a cost advantage. Thus, if vertical integration is available to all,
then the rival’s value should fall only from foreclosure, not from efficiency
gains, and all reductions in rivals’ values can be attributed to foreclosure.
Second, the merger announcement may convey information to management and
shareholders of the unintegrated rivals. Information that significant
efficiency gains are available from vertical integration may cause
unintegrated rivals to vertically integrate themselves, either by merger or by
internal expansion of their own operations. Alternatively, the information
may relate to the existence of significant underutilized assets, which may
cause rivals that also have underutilized assets to be "in play." Both types
of information will cause the profits and therefore the stock price of
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’If the gains to rivals can be realized by internal expansion, no effect would
Occur.
unintegrated rivals of the merging firm to increase. The predictions of these
alternative hypotheses are summarized in the first column of Table I.
A finding of no significant negative stock price movement has two
possible implications for the foreclosure hypothesis. One possibility that is
that the effects on rivals are small, so no significant anticompetitive
foreclosure occurred. The second possibility is that the effects are large
and significant, but the negative foreclosure effect is offset by the positive
information effects.
To disentangle these two possibilities, we also examine the returns to
stockholders of unintegrated rivals on the announcement that t.he Justice
Department or the Federal Trade Commission is contesting the merger to prevent
foreclosure of competitors. If foreclosure is a problem, the stock price of
the unintegrated rivals should increase when the government announces its
antitrust complaint to prevent foreclosure. Preventing a merger with
efficiency gains would also cause the stockholder returns of unintegrated
rivals to rise, because the firms that are attempting to merge will be unable
to realize those gains through a merger.The information effect, on the other hand, is likely to be minimal. If
the original merger proposal revealed that the industry had significant
undervalued assets, no new information concerning the undervaluation would be
revealed by.an antitrust complaint. If the information suggested that
efficiency gains could be realized by vertically integrating, the unintegrated
firms still have the option of integrating by internal expansion.
Consequently, if foreclosure is the dominant effect of a vertical
merger, the stock price of unintegrated rivals should drop on the announcement
of the merger and rise on the announcement of an antitrust complaint. If the
foreclosure effect was significant but offset by information effects, then the
merger announcement would have no effect but the complaint announcement would
have a positive effect. Since the efficiency and foreclosure hypotheses move
in the same direction, the pattern of stock prices described above will be~_~
consistent with the foreclosure hypothesis, but it cannot prove that
foreclosure occurred. However, it is possible to reject the foreclosure
hypothesis if the stock price movements are not consistent with the pattern
described above and in Table I.
Note that these different hypotheses have similar implications for the
reaction of stock prices of target and acquiring firms. Regardless of the
effects of a vertical merger, the stock price for the target firm should rise,
since target shareholders will sell their shares only if the acquiring firm
offers them a premium, For the acquiring firm, the effects are ambiguous.
3A possible complication is that if the unintegrated rival could gain the
efficiency benefit by integrating, its value would rise on the announcement
that the merger is contested, because it might become more efficient than the
merging partners. However, even if the merging partners are prevented from
vertically integrating .by acquisition, they still have the option to
vertically integrate by internal expansion.While the combined share value of the acquiring and target firms should rise
under the market efficiency or foreclosure hypothesis, the effects on the
acquiring firm will depend on how much of the increased value is captured by
target shareholders. In our sample, the two-day cumulative average return was
12.2 percent for the targets and 1.9 percent for the acquirers, and both were
statistically significant at the I percent confidence level.~
The different hypotheses also have similar implications for the reaction
of stock prices of target and acquiring firms to the announcement of an
antitrust complaint. An antitrust complaint should increase the probability
that the merger will not be consummated, preventing any potential gains that
would accrue from the acquisition. In addition, it increases the probability
of incurring significant legal expenses. As a result, both the target and
acquiring firms are expected to react negatively to a an announcement of an
antitrust complaint. In our sample, the two-day cumulative average return was
-6~I percent for the targets and -1.2 percent for the acquirers, and both were
statistically significant at the I percent confidence level.5 Since the
competing hypotheses are not differentiated by examining the share prices of
targets or acquirers, we focus our empirical test on the rivals.
4The target firms in the 20-day event window have risk-adjusted gains of
20 percent and for the largest event window (35 days) the risk-adjusted gains
are 24 percent. Both are significantly different from zero at the i percent
confidence level. These gains are similar to the gains reported in Jensen and
Ruback’s (1983) survey of gains from mergers. Thus, at the time of the
announcement, the merger is expected to succeed.
5Because the antitrust complaints frequently occurred subsequent to the
acquisition, only 7 targets remain in the sample for the complaint date.
~For both the acquirer and the target, the merger and complaint
announcements are statistically significant at the 1 percent confidence level.
Thus, any failure to find an effect on rivals is not because the announcements
are viewed as economically insignificanto
8Data
To determine if anticompetitive foreclosure is a serious problem, we
examined all vertical mergers challenged by the Oustice Department and the
Federal Trade Commission for the period from ]963 to 1982. These cases are
summarized in the American Bar Association’s Merqer Case Diqest and in various
editions of the Commerce Clearing House Trade Requlation Reporter. From the
case summaries and a reading of the actual cases, the products and their
vertical relationships are established. Because vertical relationships are
difficult to determine, we exami.ne only challenged cases in which the
antitrust authorities had not only established the vertical relationship, but
also indicated the belief that foreclosure was a serious potential problem.
Since the test of the foreclosure theory requires an evaluation of the
effect of vertical merger announcements on the rivals of the merged firm, it
is important to carefully determine the rival firms that produced the same
products at the time of the merger. Generally, competitors were not listed in
the cases, so we referred to various trade publications for the year prior to
the merger. For most cases, competitors were found in Thomas’ Reqister of
Products and Services, which provides a list of the producers of raw
materialS, industrial products, and intermediate goods and services. This
list of rivals at the time of the merger was supplemented by contacts with
trade associations, trade publications, phone conversations with company
officials, and general sources such as the Chemical Buyers Handbook. To be
included in the sample, the rival had to trade on the New York or American
stock exchange so that its share prices were available on the CRSP tapes.
This procedure has several advantages over alternative test designs.
Other studies examining horizontal mergers have found rivals by using 4-digitSIC pr6duct codes from the CRSP tape, Standard & Poor’s Reqistr¥ of
Corporations, or Dunn and Bradstreet’s Million Dollar Directory. However, SIC
product codes are sometimes broader than the product relevant for a case. Our
classification system omits some rivals, but it has the advantage that our
rivals produce the products cited in the case.
Only unintegrated rivals may be foreclosed by a vertical merger, because
integrated rivals will not face the higher marginal costs that occur b~cause
of the vertical merger. We eliminated any firm that we found to be producing
in both upstream and downstream markets according to the sources we used to
identify rivals. In addition, we talked with company officials and used SIC
codes from Standard & Poor’s Reqistry of Corporations to verify that our
rivals were unintegrated. Since 4-digit SIC designations were often broader
than the product categories in the case, some unintegrated competitors are
eliminated. However, this approach is preferred, because including integrated
firms in the sample will bias the results against finding effects from
foreclosure. We dropped from our sample vertical merger cases challenged by
federal agencies under any of the following conditions:
I. If no clear vertical relationship could be established, either because
horizontal or conglomerate concerns dominated the vertical aspects of the case
or because the potential for foreclosure could not be defined. For exampl-e;
in the ITT Canteen case the vertica7 relationship was both a food service
provider and a buyer of food services. Since any firm could purchase food
services, no clear potential for foreclosure could be established and the case
was dropped from this Study.
I02. If all of the rivals were vertically integrated or the unintegrated rivals
were not listed on the New York or American stock exchanges.
3. If no merger announcement could be established. The New York Times~ The
Wall Street Journal, and in some cases employees of the firms were consulted
to ascertain merger dates.
4. If neither the acquirer nor the target appeared on the CRSP tape.
The major reason for dropping cases was that the merger announcement was
not available. The final sample included 19 cases and 150 rival firms for the
merger announcement window and 134 firms for the complaint announcement
window°
IV. Methodology and Empirical Results
This study follows the methodology of event studies that look at the
impact of mergers on stock prices. The methodology used in this paper is more
completely described in Dodd and Warner (1983) and Dodd (1980). While
horizontal mergers have been studied extensively, few authors have examined
7 vertical mergers.
The daily stock prices for all the rival firms were gathered for a
period 200 days prior to the first announcement of a vertical merger until 10
7Eckbo (1983) focused on horizontal merger cases and used vertical
mergers primarily as a control group in his study of horizontal mergers.
While anticompetitive horizontal mergers imply higher profit for rivals,
anticompetitive foreclosure implies lower profit for rivals. Eckbo’s
discussion and tests do not address these differences. As well as being less
selective in choosing cases and rivals, his study does not examine acquirers
as well as targets, upstrea~ and downstream differences, or structural
variables related to potential foreclosure°
11days after the merger announcement. We first formed an equally weighted
portfolio of the relevant rivals in the industry. This provides an estimate
of the impact of the merger announcement on the average rival in the industry
and avoids problems with the contemporaneous correlation across rival firms.
To test the effects of the merger, the market model is estimated from 200 to
30 days before the merger announcement. To determine the expected return
prior to the vertical merger, the following regression is estimated:
(]) Rlt=~i+bf~mt+e# t=-200...-30
where R~t is the return to firm i in period t, R~ is the return to the market
at time t, and e,, is a normally distributed error term. The abnormal return
is calculated as the difference between the actual return and the estimated
return,
(2) ER~t=R~t-aj-bf~mt
and the cumulative average residual (CAR) is the sum of the abnormal returns
over the event period (k).
(3) CAR~t=~ ER~
To determine whether the errors are significantly different than O, the errors
are standardized.
(4) SER=(ER.~/{ s~[1 +(1 )/(N) +
[ R,.,- ( R.,,-
12where s~2 is the residual variance from equation I, Rm is the average market
return over the period estimated in equation I, and N is the number of days in
the estimation period. Summing the standardized errors provides the
standardized cumulative residual which is distributed T(N-2).
(5) SCRp( SER~)k-’5
SC~ is the test statistic used for individual firms or for equally weighted
industry portfolios. When the industry portfolios are aggregated, the test
statistic is assumed to be distributed standard normal:
( 6 ) z= (ASC~ 1’5
P~
(7) ASCR=(I lI) ~_, ( SCR)
1
The announcement day is the day the announcement of the merger appears
in the Wall Street Journal. Frequently it is difficult to determine if the
announcement occurred before trading stopped for the day; therefore, the two-
day event window, which includes the day before and the day of the Wall Street
Journal announcement, is used to capture the smallest event window that
includes all announcements. We also included a three-day event window (one
day before and one day after the announcement), and a 20-day event window (15
days before the anneuncement until five days after the announcement). We
focus on the smallest event window because longer event windows are more
likely to include factors that cause a portfolio of rivals in a particular
13industry to diverge from the usual relationship with the market portfolio.
Where relevant, we cite differences that occur with the larger event windows.
The average cumulative return is examined over all industries, as shown
in Table 2. We split the sample two ways, into upstream and downstream riVals
of the merging firm, and into rivaTs of the target and the acquiring firms.
(Table 4 will provide a description of the upstream and downstream markets in
each of the cases.)8
The downstream/upstream split examines whether foreclosure is more
likely in downstream markets, as suggested by Salinger (1988; 1989). The
target/acquirer split focuses on informational gains, which may differ between
these two groups. If rivals of targets are more likely to be acquired as more
bidders realize the potential gains of vertical integration, we may expect
rivals in the target industry to be more likely to show positive gains.
The statistical results are inconsistent with the foreclosure
hypothesis. For the two-day event window, only the rivals of the acquiring
firm have negative residuals.~ Furthermore, none of the event windows is
significant at the 5 percent 7evel.
The evidence from stock price movements suggests that foreclosure is not
the dominant effect of vertical mergers on unintegrated rivals. It is
possible, however, that the negative effects of foreclosure on unintegrated
rivals’ stock prices are offset by a positive information effect. To examine
8As noted above, we focus on the unintegrated rivals because of the
consistent result in theoretical work that they should be less profitable. We
did examine integrated rivals and found no statistically significant effect on
rival stock prices of a merger announcement.
81t is possible for the mean cumulative residual to be positive and the
mean cumulative standardized residual to be negative if most residuals are
positive with a few large negative outliers~
14Table 2










Downstream Upstream Target Acquiring
Rivals Rivals Rivals Rivals
.001 .000 .003 -.002
.272 -.415 1.068 -1.067
.002 -.002 .004 .003
.807 -.529 1.240 -.791
.004 -.002 .011 -.007
.298 -.018 1.297 -.887
this possibility, we reviewed the announcement of the antitrust complaint that
was designed to prevent foreclosure. As noted above, the announcement of the
complaint will have little information content, so if foreclosure is a
problem, the complaint announcement should cause the stock price of
unintegrated rivals to rise. Table 3 shows the rivals’ reaction to an
announcement of an antitrust complaint. For the all unintegrated rivals
(first column), the signs are negative but statistically insignificant for the
three event windows examined. Similarly, when the sample is split between
downstream and upstream rivals and between target and acquiring rivals, the
signs are generally negative but insignificant. This evidence provides no
support for the foreclosure hypothesis.
The lack of support for the foreclosure hypothesis may be a result of
the aggressive stance towards vertical foreclosure taken in the 1960s and
1970s. If many weak cases are undertaken by the government, the extent of
possible foreclosure may be biased against finding an effect when the data are
averaged across all cases. Since the Krattenmaker and Salop (1986) and the
Salinger (!988) models both require market power for anticompetitive
15Table 3
Response of Stock Prices of Rival Firms to Announcement of Complaint by
Antitrust Authorities
Days i n
Event_ All Downstream Upstream Target Acquiring
Window Measure Rivals Rivals Rivals Rivals Rivals
2    Residual -.004 -.006 -.001 -.007 -.00]
Z Statistic -1.163 -1.468 .132 -1.926 .195
Residual -.002 -.005 .003 -.006 .002
Z Statistic -.271 -.969 .640 -1.158 .700
20 Residual -.001 -.006 .006 .005 -.006
Z Statistic .355 -.268 .806 .938 -.382
foreclosure, structural variables can help identify the most likely cases for
market foreclosure. Table 4 provides lists of firms and products,as well as
the two-day residual and several structural variables. The first structural
variable is the four-firm concentration ratio for the 5-digit product class.
The concentration ratio was taken from the Census of Manufactures volume
immediately preceding the announcement date, unless otherwise noted. For non-
manufacturing industries, no four-firm concentration ratio was available. For
those cases involving manufacturing industries, the concentration ratios
are quite high; in 13 of the 17 cases, the concentration ratios were at least
50 percent in either the upstream or the downstream market.
The second structural variable was a measure of economies of scale.
Using methodology first used by Commanor and Wilson (1967), we calculate the
average plant size among the largest plants accounting for 50 percent of the
industry’s output, scaled by total industry output. The industries where
economies of scale are most important tend to be the most concentrated, but
the overall correlation of 0.13 is low.
16Table 4
Structural Variables in Vertical Merger Cases
Two-Day
Firm A=* D=# Residual
Albertsons I I -.010
Mountain 0 0 -.010
Attis 1 I .024
Simglicity 0 0 .022
Aluminum I 0 -.003
National 0 I -.005
Budd I 0 -.008
Gindy 0 I .081
Caterpillar I I o.003
Chicago 0 0 .014
Cooper I 0 .011
WauKesha 0 I .012
Eaton I 0 .004
McQUaay 0 I -.014
Ehdicott I 0 -.010
Nobil 0 I .004
Fruehauf I I -.019
Kelsey-Haye 0 0 .015
Gifford 1 0 -.004
Becker 0 1 .007
Genera{ 1 0 -.013
Gorton 0 I -.017
[nco I 0 .076
ESB 0 I .014
Chrysler I I .005
Mack 0 0 -.007
Combustion 1 1 .002


































































































































19,454Table 4 - continued
Structural Variables in Vertical Merger Cases
Four-Firm Economy Absolute
Two-Day Announcement Concentration of Capital
Firm A:*_ D=# Residual Product Date Ratio-~%) Scale 45 Thousands)
Occidental I 0 -.007 resins 1978 25 .032 69,975
Mead 0 I -.018 paper mill 1978 25 .035 88,752
OKC I 0 .005 cement hydrolic 1969 8~ .006 15,725
Janke 0 I .014 ready-mix cement 1969 34b .001 785
Firestone I 0 -.001 tire manufacturer 1965 72 .030 42,063
Abel 0 I -.007 tire retailer 1965
White Cons. I 1 -.015 farm machinery 1970 45 .018 24,298
White Motor 0 0 -.007 diesel engines 1970 81 .036 24,471
illinois C. I 0 .004 brake parts 1971 63 .014 87,360
Midas 0 I -.019 brake repair 1971
* acquirer = I, target = 0
# downstream = I, upstream = 0
" Concentration ratio taken from case
b Concentration ratio taken from "Economic Report on Mergers and. Vertical Integration in the Cement Industry," Federal Trade Commission, 1967.
concentration ratios are for the regions specified in the case° since cement is a regional market.
TheThe third structural variable is absolute capital requirements. Again
following methodology first used by Commanor and Wilson (1967), we multiply
the average output level of the plants estimated to be of minimum efficient
scale times the ratio ef depreciable assets to the value of shipments, taken
from the Annual Survey of Manufactures the year prior to the announcement
date. While the correlation between absolute capital and concentration is low
(0.14), the correlation betwee~ economies of scale and absolute capital is
O.37.
We also tried to use an advertising/sales ratio from the Internal
Revenue Service Source Book. Only four industries had an advertising/sales
ratio greater than i percent, presumably because most of the products in our
sample are not consumer goods. Because the values were so low as to be
unlikely to serve as a barrier to entry, and because it made no difference in
any of the statistical tests, we have omitted this variable.
Table 5 reports the results of regressing the two-day cumulative
residuals on our three structural variables. We also add two dummy variables;
a dummy variable that is I for the acquirer industry and 0 for the target
industry, and a dummy variable that is I for downstream and 0 for upstream
industries. The theoretical models of Salinger (1988) and Ordover, Saloner
and Salop (1990) have foreclosure occurring in the downstream market.
Consistent with these models, the downstream dummy should be negative.
Concentration ratios, economies of scale, and absolute capital should all be
negative, as more concentrated industries (and greater barriers to entry)
result in greater negative returns for unintegrated rivals. The
results do not provide much support for foreclosure. None of the variablesTable 5





















are significantly different from 0 at the 5 percent confidence level, and the
coefficient on economies of scale has the wrong sign.
While over the entire sample the structural variables provide no support
for the foreclosure hypothesis, it is possible that in the most concentrated
industries significant foreclosure occurred. Table 6 provides the two-day
cumulative residuals for cases where both the upstream and the downstream
markets had four-firm concentration ratios greater than 50 percent. In both
upstream and downstream markets, three of the four cases have apositive
coefficient and none of the coefficients are significat at the 5
positive percent confidence level. Thus, even in the most concentrated
industries the evidence is inconsistent with foreclosure.
2OTable 6
Response of Stock Prices of Rival Firms to Announcements of Vertical Mergers
in Highly Concentrated Industries
DOWNSTREAM UPSTREAM
Four-Firm Four-Firm
Downstream Concentration Two-Day Upstream Concentration Two-Day
-Firm Ratio Residual Firm Ratio Residual
Caterpillar 81 -.003 Chicago 90 .014
Waukesha 91 .012 Cooper 58 .011
ESB 58 .014 Inco 74 .076
Chrysler 81 .005 Mack 72 -.007
Our finding indicates that vertical mergers contested in the past did
not have significant foreclosure of unintegrated rivals. However, the absence
of effects in industries with high concentration ratios and substantial
barriers to entry, factors considered in Department of Justice guidelines for
vertical mergers, has implications for future antitrust policies. Before more
activist policy against vertical mergers is resumed, more work needs to be
done to determine if the theoretical models have any empirical relevance.
V. Conclusion
Recent theoretical models show that foreclosure from vertical mergers
can result in higher costs for unintegrated competitors and higher prices for
consumers. A necessary but not a sufficient condition for anticompetitive
foreclosure is that unintegrated rivals will be less profitable. In a sample
selected from all vertical mergers challenged by the Justice Department and
the Federal Trade Commission between 1963 and 1982, we find no evidence of
anticompetitive foreclosure.
The failure to find significant foreclosure may be due, in part, to the
aggressive prosecution of vertica~ merger cases during this period. If
21mergers with potential foreclosure issues were avoided because of the threat
of litigation, we might not find any foreclosure in contested cases. Assuming
that the strongest cases were contested, our evidence indicates that few if
any vertical mergers during this period had anticompetitive effects.
Among those cases that were contested, several had very high four-firm
concentration levels at the 5-digit level of classification. These cases
provide no support for foreclosure. Similarly, cases with high barriers to
entry, such as economies of scale and absolute capital requirements, provide
no evidence of foreClosure.
The results reported in this paper do not preclude economic foreclosure
as a possibility; however, during the period examined, the Justice Department
and the Federal Trade Commission did not identify cases where foreclosure was
a problem. As long as cases where economic foreclosure occurs are difficult
to identify, the enforcement agencies’ current neglect of vertical merger
cases is well founded. For theoretical models of anticompetitive mergers to
be useful to po]icymakers, they must provide methods of identifying cases that
should be contested.
22Appendix
The purpose of this Appendix is to illustrate that a necessary condition
for anticompetitive foreclosure is that unintegrated rivals are less
profitable after the merger. We use a simple Cournot model consistent with
Salinger’s model (1988) and assume that the input and the final product are
produced under constant marginal cost conditions, and that after the merger
the integrated firm no longer sells inputs to its unintegrated rivals in the
downstream market. We assume that the firm vertically integrating (firm i}
and the n unintegrated rivals have linear demand and linear fixed coefficient
Cost curves in the downstream market. For simplicity, we assume the n
unintegrated rivals are identical so that the rivals have identical costs,
though this assumption can be relaxed without altering the results.
(8) P= A- B( ql + ~_~ q.,)
i=2
(9) Cl =a~ql, cra~q~
where:
P = price of final product
CI = total cost for firm I
C~ = total cost for firm i
ql = quantity of goods sold by firm vertically integrating
q~ = quantity of goods sold by unintegrated firm i
al = marginal cost of firm vertically integrating
a2 = marginal cost of unintegrated rivals.
i=2, ....n+l
23Assume that ~i is the profit from the downstream operations of the firm
vertically integrating and ~ is the Drofit in the downstream market for its
unintegrated competitors.
n+i
(11) ~j=Aqi-B(q~ +~_, qj)qi-a2qi
In equation 12, the reaction functions of firm I and the unintegrated firms
are derived from the first order conditions. In equation 13, the equilibrium
quantities for firm I and the unintegrated firms, which are a function of the
demand parameters and each firm’s marginal cost, are obtained by equating the
reaction functions.
(i2)
ql =[ (A- a~)/ (2 B) j -(1/2nq.,)
q~=[(A-a2)/(2B)]-[(1/2)(ql +(n-1)q.,)]
(13)
ql =[(A-(n+ 1)a~)+(na.~.)]j[(n+2) B)]
qi=(A-2a2 +a~)/[(n+2)B’J
Substituting the values for q: and q~ in ~equation 13 into equation 8, we solve
for the price in the downstream market, which can be written as
(1.4) P=(A+ a~ +na2)l(n+2)In Salinger’s model a vertical merger has two effects. One, competition
in the unintegrated segment of the input market decreases because
the merged firm neither buys from nor sells to the unintegrated dowhstream
firms, causlng the price of the input to unintegrated firms in the downstream
market to rise. And two, the marginal cost of the merged firm in the
downstream market falls because it can avoid the monopoly rents charged in the
upstream market. The lower marginal cost allows the merged firm to lower its
price in the downstream market and expand its output, thus reducing the
derived demand for the unintegrated rivals in the upstream market. When the
effect of the decrease in competition dominates the decrease in the derived
demand, the price of the input to the unintegrated segment of the downstream
market increases. When this effect exceeds the reduction in the integrated
firm’s cost, the price of the final product increases and the consumers are
made worse off.
The implication of Salinger’s model is that a vertical merger will lead
to economic foreclosure when the following three conditions are met. One, the
marginal cost to the unintegrated rival in the downstream market (a2)
increases. Two, the marginal cost to the integrated rival (al) decreases.
And three, the decrease in the final product marginal cost for the integrated
firm is less than the increase in the final product marginal cost for the
unintegrated firm (i.e., -dal < da2).
The effects of an increase in the marginal cost of the unintegrated
rival (a2) in the downstream market are"
25(15)
( dql )l ( da~) = n/[ ( n + 2 ) BJ,
( dq,)l( da.z) =(-2)/[(n+2)B~,
( dP~l( =[ n( n + 2) ]
Since the increase in the final product marginal cost to the unintegrated firm
reduces its output, and since the final product price-increases less than the
increase in marginal cost (i.e., dp/da2 < I), the profits of the unintegrated
rival in the downstream market will fall. The effects of the decrease in
marginal cost of the integrated firm (al) on unintegrated rivals are:
(16)
(dql)l(da~)=[-(n+ 1)]/[(n+2)B~,
(dq.,)l( da~)= ll[(n+ 2)BJ,
(dl~/(da~)= l/(n+2)
Again, the unintegrated rival in the downstream market is less
profitable, since the lower marginal cost for the integrated firm decreases
both the price and the quantity of goods sold by the unintegrated rival.
Thus, a decrease in al results in lower profits:
(17) (d~ )l(da~)=(q~B+P-a~l[(n+2)BJ>-O
Therefore, both the increase in a2 and the decrease in a~ result
lower profits for unintegrated firms in the downstream market.References
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